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FOREWORD: TOWARD A RACE-CONSCIOUS
PEDAGOGY IN LEGAL EDUCATION
Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw*
It is both an honor and a pleasure to write the Foreword for this issue of
the NATIONAL BLACK LAW JOURNAL. This project represents the culmination of a joint effort involving the NBLJ, Dean Susan Westerberg Prager and
me. The project grew out of discussions that began in the Spring of 1987 in
which we explored various ways that the law school could support the production of publishable student material for the Journal. I initially considered
sponsoring interested students in independent research projects; however, a
high level of student interest, an obvious overlap between proposed student
topics, and my own interest in developing alternative pedagogical strategies
combined to make a seminar the most attractive option.
After receiving suggested themes for the proposed issue from Journal
members, I attempted to develop a seminar that would reflect our substantive
interests and that would also be responsive to some of the problems that I
believe confront minority students in traditional classrooms. The seminar that
resulted--"Minority Voting Rights and Majoritarian Domination"-reflected
an effort to further three interrelated objectives: 1) to explore the successes
and failures of the legal strategies developed to address political disenfranchisement on the basis of race; 2) to create an environment that presented
an alternative to the traditional classroom experiences of minority students in
majority-centered law schools; and 3) to provide a support structure specifically designed to produce publishable student material. In this Foreword, I
will sketch my own view of some of the difficulties confronting minorities in
the classroom and explain how the seminar was developed to address them.
These views are impressions based on recollections and experiences that I have
gathered from observing classroom dynamics from both sides of the law
school podium. Although none of these ideas are based on empirical research,
I hope nonetheless that they provide a basis for interpreting the seminar and
that they may perhaps offer some ideas for further discussion.
RACE IN THE LAW SCHOOL CLASSROOM

Minority students across the country have waged a series of protests to
draw attention to problems of diversity in the nation's law schools.1 Although
* Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles, B.A., Cornell University,
1981; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1984; L.L.M., University of Wisconsin, 1985.
I am grateful to several friends and colleagues who offered helpful comments on earlier drafts of
this Foreword. I would like especially to thank Richard Yarborough, Duncan Kennedy, Neil Gotanda and the Editors of the NATIONAL BLACK LAW JOURNAL all of whom have been most generous

in providing me with their time, insights, patience, and support.
I. See, eg., Law Students Protest,N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1988, at A24, col. 4 (Boalt Hall student
protest over the lack of women and minority group members among tenured faculty); Stanford
Rights Class DroppedAfter Black Protest, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1983, § 1, at 27, col. 1; (protest in

support of Harvard Black law students January 1983 protest); Students Picket Law Course in Rights
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the students' bottom line demand is often for the recruitment of more minority
faculty and students, the anger and frustration apparent in these protests indicate that the disappointment is not simply over the lack of "color" in the
hallways.2 The dissatisfaction goes much deeper-to the substantive dynamics of the classroom and their particular impact on minority students.3 In
many instances, minority students' values, beliefs, and experiences clash not
only with those of their classmates but also with those of their professors. 4
Yet because of the dominant view in academe that legal analysis can be taught
without directly addressing conflicts of individual values, experiences, and
world views, these conflicts seldom, if ever, reach the surface of the classroom
discussion. Dominant beliefs in the objectivity of legal discourse serve to suppress the conflict by discounting the relevance of any particular perspective
in legal analysis and by positing an analytical stance that has no specific cultural, political, or class characteristics. I call this dominant mode
"perspectivelessness."
This norm of perspectivelessness is problematic in general, and particularly burdensome on minority students. While it seems relatively straightforward that objects, issues, and other phenomena are interpreted from the
vantage point of the observer, many law classes are conducted as though it is
possible to create, weigh, and evaluate rules and arguments in ways that
neither reflect nor privilege any particular perspective or world view. Thus,
Protestat Harvard,N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1983, at A16, col. 1 (protest over school's record in recruiting
Black teachers); Goal ofBoycott at HarvardLaw, N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1982, at A26, col. 6 (studentwritten editorial on law student protest at Harvard Law School).
Some students have protested against changes in diversity programs that they feared would
weaken the programs' effectiveness. See Roark, UCLA Stiffens Requirementsfor Law School, L.A.
Times, May 3, 1987, § 2, at 1, col. 5 (UCLA law faculty votes to toughen admission standards); L.A.
Times, Apr. 29, 1987, § 1, at 2, col. 1 (UCLA student protest over changing admissions standards at
the law school).
2. A recent study suggest that diversity is a major problem in the nations law schools. See
Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minoritiesand Women on American Law School Faculties, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 537 (1988). Chused's statistics indicate that two-thirds of the nations law schools
have one or no minorities on their faculties. Only a third have more than one minority faculty
member.
3. See e.g., Letter from Benita Ramsey to the Dean of the University of Miami Law School
(July 1, 1987)(chronicling how "law as an institution perpetuates disillusionment and discontent from
its students of color.") (on file with author).
4. In order to sketch the contours of this conflict I offer some generalizations about contrasting
Black and white perspectives that I think are relevant. I rely on no empirical data to support the
generalizations. I realize that any conclusions drawn from such generalizations are tentative at best
and are compelling only to the extent that the underlying generalizations seem plausible. Nonetheless
I think it is important to put these perceptions forward for discussion. Also, I have limited these
particular generalizations to white and Black students, although they may be more broadly applicable
to differences between white and other minority students as well.
Black students are likely to have encountered more racist treatment and attitudes than white
students. Moreover, Black students are more likely to view American society as racist, characterized
by systematic differences in power, wealth and status. Blacks are likely to be somewhat aware that
law has played a role in maintaining racial privilege. Whites, although aware that racial subordination is a problem, are unlikely to view racism as a constant or central feature of American life. As a
consequence of these conflicting views, while Black students are likely to be concerned with the impact of laws on the Black community, white students are unlikely to think about the impact of laws
upon the Black community unless and until the question is raised by Black students. Even when the
potential impact is raised, white students are likely to balance these concerns with other interests and
values. Moreover, they probably view the Black students' concerns as racial and specially interested,
while the other values or world views that are routinely invoked are not viewed as racial or selfinterested, but as general-or even universal-values.
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law school discourse proceeds with the expectation that students will learn to
perform the standard mode of legal reasoning and embrace its presumption of
perspectivelessness. When this expectation is combined with the fact that
what is understood as objective or neutral is often the embodiment of a white
middle-class world view, minority students are placed in a difficult situation.
To assume the air of perspectivelessness that is expected in the classroom,
minority students must participate in the discussion as though they were not
African-American or Latino, but colorless legal analysts. 5 The consequence of
adopting this colorless mode is that when the discussion involves racial minorities, minority students are expected to stand apart from their history, their
identity, and sometimes their own immediate circumstances and discuss issues
without making reference to the reality that the "they" or "them" being discussed is from their perspective "we" or "us." Conversely, on the few occasions when minority students are invited to incorporate their racial identity
and experiences into their comments, they often feel as though they have been
put on the spot. Moreover, their comments are frequently disregarded by
other students who believe that since race figures prominently in such comments, the minority students-unlike themselves-are expressing biased, selfinterested, or subjective opinions. The result is that minority students can
seldom ground their analysis in their own racial experiences without risking
some kind of formal or informal sanction. Minority students escape the twin
problems of objectification and subjectification in discussions when minority
experiences are deemed to be completely irrelevant, or are obscured by the
centering of the discussion elsewhere. The price of this sometimes welcomed
invisibility, however, can be intense alienation. I will elaborate on these dilemmas below.
The Problem of Objectification
Instructors create the conditions that lead to the objectification of minority students by narrowly framing classroom discussions as simple exercises in
rule application and by not giving students permission to step outside the doctrinal boundaries to comment on or critique the rules. If the subject involves
some issue, rule, or case that is implicated in the subordination of the students'
racial group, minority students confront unattractive options. To illustrate,
consider a discussion in Property where the class is instructed to identify and
apply a rule involving a lessee's responsibility for damage suffered by the lessor's property during the term of the lease. The professor has asked the class
to discuss the application of the rule in a suit for damages by the owner of a
deceased slave against a lessee who was responsible for supervising the slave
when he was killed. The ambiguity that the'students are asked to resolve is
whether the slave should be treated as mere chattel, in which case the slave
owner will recover, or whether the slave should be treated as a human agent,
in which case the lessee's responsibility will probably be mitigated. 6 If the
5. For an argument that colorblindness is a series of complex and contradictory norms and
beliefs that legitimizes white supremacy see N. Gotanda, Toward A Critique of Colorblind (1989)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
6. Several cases confronted the courts and apologists for slavery with the complex task of
resolving the contradiction between the fact of the slaves' humanity and the legal fiction of the slaves'
being mere chattel. Compare the discussion of State v. Mann, 13 N.C. 263 (1829) (contradiction
resolved by claiming that the slave was property and that the power of the master over the slave was
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instructor does not open the door for students to question the very legitimacy
of this doctrinal framework, the African-American student is faced with a
difficult choice. To participate correctly in the discussion, she must abstract
herself from her identity as an African-American, a descendent of the very
people who were enslaved under the fiction of human chattel. She must ignore
her personal perceptions and judgments about the illegitimacy of the doctrine
under consideration and become a colorless student attempting to demonstrate her legal talents by manipulating the legal abstraction within the narrow
boundaries already established.
Alternatively, she could choose to explode the abstraction by stepping
outside the doctrinal bounds to discuss how the very question that she is asked
to address holds constant the legal fiction of human chattel. She could refuse
to participate in the objectification of her ancestors, and instead, reveal how
this very framework perpetuates the devaluation of African-American perspectives. She would thus challenge her classmates' beliefs in the perspectivelessness of law and reveal how discussing slavery within such narrowly
constructed boundaries immunizes the law from serious criticism. Yet no
matter how eloquent her performance, offering such a response would be
costly for the student. Should she choose to step outside the boundaries of
classroom decorum, she would risk being regarded as an emotional-perhaps
even an hysterical-Black person railing against the law in an obviously biased, unlawyerlike manner.
I acknowledge that this particular scenario may be rare. Indeed, it is unlikely that many Property instructors discuss the law of slavery, and it is even
more unlikely to find anyone attempting to resolve slavery's legal contradictions today. Yet other examples can be easily generated that raise similar, if
not identical, dilemmas for minorities in the classroom. Consider discussions
of probable cause where the reasonableness of an officer's suspicion requires
students to view the situation through the eyes of the arresting officer.7 It is
not unusual for professors to base a hypothetical on the presence of a Black
person in a white neighborhood. When the instructor has not opened the dialogue to allow students to question the potentially discriminatory effects of
determining reasonableness from the perspective of the arresting officer, the
minority student is essentially required to look back at herself to determine
whether her own presence in a white neighborhood would be sufficient cause
for her to arrest herself.' Similar dilemmas are confronted when the discusabsolute, thus permitting a hirer to maim the slave without legal liability) with Gorman v. Campbell,
14 Ga. 137 (1853) (slave owner can recover monetary damages if slave is regarded as property but if
slave is classified as a human with agency then the hirer's responsibility for injury suffered by the
slave is mitigated by slave's own actions) in M. TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 18101860: CONSIDERATIONS OF HUMANITY AND INTEREST 3-6, 51-65 (1981). For another discussion of
the legal structure of slavery see also A. HIGGINBOTrHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE
AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD

(1978).

7. See e.g. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (discussing whether there was probable

cause to arrest a Black man walking at night in an all-white neighborhood), rev'd on other grounds.
8. The expectation that minorities can and should objectify themselves even in discussions of
race can sometimes reach absurd proportions. Professor Pat Williams' account of her racially-motivated exclusion from a New York boutique offers an example of such an expectation. In recounting

white store owners' response to the controversy over their racially discriminatory use of buzzers to
refuse entry to "undesirables," Professor Williams noted that the "repeated public urgings that blacks
put themselves in the shoes of white store owners" in effect expected blacks to "look into the mirror

of frightened whites faces to the reality of their undesirability; and that then blacks would 'just as
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sion turns to the reasonableness of an Immigration and Naturalization Service
agent's detention of a car containing Latino passengers. The tension created
by the expectation of objectivity and the reality that a Chicana student might
herself be in that situation essentially places her in the awkward position of
considering whether from the perspective of the agent, it would be reasonable
to detain herself and a car of her friends as suspected undocumented workers. 9
A Japanese-American student considering the reasonableness of the government's World War II internment of Japanese-Americans confronts a similar
dilemma. Unless given leave to discuss the internment from a Japanese-American perspective, she has to consider whether from the point of view of some
government decision-makers, her parents represented a threat to the national
security such that their internment satisfied a compelling state interest. 10
In each of these cases minority students confront difficult choices. To
play the game right, they have to assume a stance that denies their own identity and requires them to adopt an apparently objective stance as the given
starting point of analysis. Should they step outside the doctrinal constraints,
not only have they failed in their efforts to "think like a lawyer," they have
committed an even more stigmatizingfaux pas: they have taken the discussion
far afield by revealing their emotional preoccupation with their racial identity.
Given the infrequency with which most law teachers create the space for
and legitimize responses that acknowledge the significance of a racially-informed perspective, it is not surprising that minority students often choose the
role of "good student" rather than run the risk of appearing to be incapable of
exercising the proper decorum and engagement in legal analysis. Such experiences teach minority students that in law school discourse, their cultural and
experiential knowledge is not important or relevant. Indeed, they learn that
any failure to observe the constructed dichotomy between the rational-read
non-racial and non-personal-and the emotional-read racial and experiential-may elicit derision or disregard. To expect minority students to feel
surely conclude that [they] would not let [themselves] in under similar circumstances.'" Williams,
Spirit-Murderingthe Messenger The DiscourseofFingerpointingas the Law's Response to Racism, 42
MIAMI L. REv. 127, 129 (1987) (quoting Letter to the Editor from Michael Levin and Marguerita
Levin, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1987, at E32, col. 3).
Another manifestation of the presumption that analysis can and should stand apart from the
racial identity of the speaker is revealed in Professor Williams' subsequent account of her struggles
with law review editors to include reference to her racial identity in writing about her exclusion from
the New York boutique. Williams, "And We Are Not Married: A Journal of Musings, Legal Language and the Ideology of Style in CONSEQUENCES OF THEORY (B. Johnson and J. Arce eds. (forthcoming)). According to Professor Williams, the editors initially deleted all references to her racial
identity informing her that references to "physiogomy" were irrelevant. Yet the absence of an explicit "physiogomy" does not constitute racial neutrality but simply permits the reader to assume
whiteness. The presence of this assumption-however unconscious it may be-is revealed when the
story is told without referring to Professor Williams' race. As Professor Williams points out, if the
racial identity of the speaker is not included, the point of the story is unintelligible.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (no constitutional violation
for INS officials at a fixed border checkpoint to selectively detain persons on the basis of apparent
Mexican ancestry).
10. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (Court finding the potential national
security threat presented by persons of Japanese ancestry warranted the internment of West Coast
Japanese-Americans). Even though retrospective reviews of the opinion have been generally critical,
Japanese-American students whose families were affected by the decision may still feel compelled to
adopt the posture of the decisionmaker even in arguing against the reasonableness of the decision.
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comfortable or to be creative in such a classroom is the equivalent of asking
someone to perform a two-handed task with one hand tied behind her back.
This dichotomy between rational, objective commentary and mere emotional denunciation is often a false one, maintained by the belief that when
minority students step outside the bounds of rote rule application to express
their criticisms or concerns, they are violating classroom norms by being racially biased. Many of these problems could be averted if professors framed
discussions so that the boundaries of acceptable responses were not so narrowly constructed. This would give students permission to drop the air of
perspectivelessness, to stand within their own identity, and to critique the doctrine or rule directly. Yet instructors often fail to broaden the parameters of
the discussion, perhaps believing that to do so would legitimize the inclusion
of racial perspectives where none had existed before. Some may assert that
since white students do not feel the need to fall back on personal, racialized
views of the world, neither should minorities. This belief, however, is predicated on an erroneous view that white students-and indeed the instructors
themselves-are not also reflecting racialized views when they frame and discuss issues. They accept the absence of an explicitly racial referent as evidence
that the doctrinal or substantive framework being discussed is objective and
race-neutral. However, majority as well as minority students view the world
through a consciousness constructed in part through race. The appearance of
perspectivelessness is simply the illusion by which the dominant perspective is
made to appear neutral, ordinary, and beyond question. As a result, while the
perspectives of minority students are often identified as racial, the perspectives
of their majority classmates are not. Moreover, when the instructor presents
as a "given" the perspectivelessness of a particular rule or value, then many
decisions that effectively burden minority group members will appear to both
the instructor and most students to be the result of an unbiased, objective legal
analysis. As long as other perspectives are obscured by the illusion of objectivity, the fact that courts are making choices that privilege the perspectives and
interests of some groups over others will go unrecognized.
Subjectivity and the Problem of Minority "Testifying"
An equally stressful, but conceptually more obscure experience is what I
call subjectification. This is experienced by minority students when, after
learning to leave their race at the door, their racial identities are unexpectedly
dragged into the classroom by their instructor to illustrate a point or to provide the basis for a command performance of "show and tell." The eyes of the
class are suddenly fixed upon the minority student who is then expected to
offer some sort of minority "testimony." For example, in a discussion concerning whether racial epithets should be regarded as sufficient provocation to
warrant a heat-of-passion homicide defense, the professor might attempt to
ground the discussion by questioning how it feels to be called a "nigger."
Once a minority student "testifies," the class goes on to debate whether the
law can afford to recognize a manslaughter defense in such cases. Usually, the
effort to illicit the minority perspective is a cue that the discussion is a policy-as opposed to a doctrinal-discussion. The racial conflict, if any, is seen
as occurring outside of the classroom while the objective of the discussion is
apparently to determine how best to address the problem. To the extent that
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the minority student can participate in this debate, she is viewed as a biased or
specially interested party and thus, her perspectives are probably regarded as
being too subjective to have a significant bearing on the ultimate solution.
This pattern of pigeon-holing minority student responses into a "special
testimony" category occurs when their comments are essentially limited to
providing information on how it feels to live in a ghetto, to go to segregated
schools, to be harassed by police, or to risk being stigmatized by affirmative
action. Instructors who until that startling moment have made no effort to
create space for discussing how race shapes experiences or the role of law in
maintaining racial subordination are sometimes surprised that minority students resent this episodic expression of interest. Instructors may believe that
they have made a good faith attempt to include minority students in classroom
discussions by offering them an opportunity to speak about something within
their area of expertise. Yet to raise race in this way imposes multiple burdens
upon minority students. First, it reinforces the view that racial differences and
minority students' distinct racial experiences are essentially peripheral to the
main course of law. Such efforts to compartmentalize racial experiences present racism as a series of individualized anomalous occurrences rather than
systematically connected to larger institutional practices and values which are
reflected in and reinforced by law. Presenting minority viewpoints in such
narrowly-framed and marginalized discussions ignores the possibility that
these insights might have some bearing on larger issues involving the role of
law in constructing societal relationships and on the appropriateness of discussing those relationships in law school classrooms.
Second, when instructors attempt to include minority experiences while
failing to call into question the objectivity of the dominant perspective, they
fail to challenge majority students' beliefs that the minority perspective is selfinterested and biased while the doctrinal framework and their own perspectives are not. Thus, if the instructor has not given the impression that a
particular perspective or an entire doctrinal framework is subject to criticism,
minority students' perspectives will still be viewed as expressions of subjective
personal experiences.
Third, unless the instructor clearly establishes antiracism as a norm, occasional uses of racial hypotheticals may anger and deeply offend most minority students. For example, it is understandably annoying when an instructor
persists in using racial epithets or racist stereotypes while never uttering a
word about the undesirability of racism. Instructors may assume that both
minority as well as majority students are aware that the epithets or the stereotypes are not meant to cause offense. They may assume that their good faith is
obvious, that no one accepts the legitimacy of racism anymore, or, most disturbingly, that to make explicit antiracist statements would compromise the
appearance of objectivity that they seek to maintain. Whatever reason that
instructors give to justify their use of racial stereotypes or epithets without
explicitly condemning racism, the result is that minority students are given
little indication that the hostility that such statements would otherwise convey
is, in this context, not intended." Without clear indication that the stereo11. Minority students at one of the elite law schools documented a conflict with their Criminal
Law instructor over his repeated use of racial epithets and stereotypes and his refusal to challenge
white students who made comments supporting racial stereotypes. While the students welcomed the
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types or epithets are not being introduced to reinforce racism but instead, to
counter it, there is little reason to expect minority students to feel comfortable
while their colleagues freely invoke those racial stereotypes and epithets.
Finally, unless the instructor sends a clear normative message that racial
subordination should be condemned and that racism itself is not being condoned, it is quite possible that majority students will disregard or rationalize
minority experiences as the necessary costs of broader societal interests. The
entire episode can be extremely stressful for minority students; their experiences are solicited only to be ultimately dismissed as examples of hard issues,
or of compromises that are rationally mandated by mainstream societal
values.
Some of these dilemmas can be addressed by altering the way racial issues
are framed, by presenting racism as a serious societal problem, and by explicitly deprivileging dominant perspectives. Instructors wishing to explore racial
issues without contributing to the anxiety of minority students should resist
framing minority experiences in ways that make such experiences appear to be
disconnected to broader issues and that can be easily forgotten as soon as the
policy discussion is over. Instead, the frame should be shifted so as to illuminate the connection between racial subordination and the values and interests
that appear to be race-neutral or that are simply taken for granted. This
would provide space for minority students to contribute to discussions in ways
that value their perspectives and do not put them on the spot. Thus, rather
than asking how it feels to live in the ghetto, instructors wishing to explore, for
example, the legal aspects of segregation might shift the frame to discuss how
landlord-tenant law or banking practices perpetuate the maintenance of substandard dwellings in minority communities. As an alternative to asking how
it feels to go to a segregated school, it might be more illuminating to start the
discussion with how property laws and the judiciary's interpretation of the
fourteenth amendment protect the current distribution of wealth and thus perpetuate substandard schools. In Criminal Law, rather than asking whether
being called a "nigger" or "spic" should be sufficient provocation to warrant a
manslaughter instruction, one might start by asking whether a defendant's
right to a fair trial in such cases requires that the jury be made up of the
defendant's racial peers. Instead of asking how it feels to be harassed by police, or how it feels to be stigmatized by affirmative action, it might make more
sense to question whether the virtual unreviewability of police discretion perpetuates mistreatment of racial minorities, or how current conceptions of meritocracy privilege characteristics that are valued by the dominant group.
When the instructor places an entire legal framework at issue, minority
perspectives can be included in ways that illuminate better the racial consequences of dominant values, concepts, and rules. More importantly, shifting
the frame revalues distinct minority experiences; no longer are they cultural
handicaps that either must be overcome or made the subject of occasional
observation. Such experiences are instead, sources of knowledge that can be
legitimately and powerfully utilized in legal analysis. Minority students can
discussion of race, they felt that the discussion merely confirmed rather than challenged racist beliefs.
The students then met with the professor, but to no avail. The students then wrote an open letter
recounting several incidents of race bias in their classroom. Letter Regarding Criminal Law Class (on
file with author).
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gain the advantage that their majority colleagues share: their vision of the
world, their experiences and values and the things that they take for granted
can be legitimately included.
Alienation of Minorities in the Classroom
In addition to objectification and subjectification, a third category of minority classroom experience involves the alienation that is engendered by discussions that focus on problems, interests and values that either minorities do
not share or that obscure or overlook issues that are particularly relevant to
minorities. This may be the most difficult of the classroom experiences to
address because most students experience some degree of alienation during
law school and because much of what is discussed does not engage students'
personal experiences or interests. Thus, race is one of many reasons why students do not have an experiential connection with the material. Yet, there are
a few observations that can be made about the racial aspects of alienation
despite its relatively narrower role.
Although it is clear that many discussions do not involve race, it is also
true that race is often implicated in a range of ways even when it is not directly
at issue and when racial perspectives are not explicitly identified. Yet, even
though race may be implicated in some way, often, it never explicitly becomes
part of the discussion. For example, sometimes race is implicated when racial
images that lie just below the surface of the discussion inform the views of the
speakers. Perhaps the most common example is found in discussions of rape
where in many minds the image of the typical assailant is Black. Alternatively, race may also be implicated when race is not even a subtext, but the
specific inclusion of minorities in the discussion would probably reveal that it
was largely, if not exclusively premised upon white, middle-class experiences
and problems. For example, problems involving capital gains taxes, or gifts
and inheritances are apparently race neutral, but experientially, tend to be
more race specific. Taxation, property, or estate problems that typically confront minorities are probably different. Tax problems that might be more
commonly experienced by minorities might involve the taxability of pensions,
general relief, Social Security and other benefits. In Property, fraudulent conveyances and other real estate practices such as those used to deprive Southern
Blacks of real property interests represent legal issues that are more likely
experienced by minorities.
In addition to having different kinds of problems, minorities may be more
concerned about the racial implications of the topics. For example, questions
over the tax-exempt status of institutions that discriminate on the basis of race
are likely to be of interest to minority students. The racial dimensions of
traditional law school subject areas are seldom discussed. On the few occasions when racial dimensions are considered the issues raised are either summarily addressed or mentioned only in passing.
Racial perspectives may be implicated in other discussions where the
presence or absence of certain experiences which are themselves related to race
lead to different descriptive and normative perspectives on issues unrelated to
race. For instance, in discussions about the tension between federal and state
powers, students' whose history suggests that for them the most significant
threat to their personal autonomy has been state inaction rather than federal
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action are likely to be more sympathetic to federal intervention than students
who cannot readily imagine having to rely on the federal government for protection against local authority.
In these and other discussions where the framework established by the
professor precludes the acknowledgement of the racial dimensions of certain
topics, minority students may be disinclined to actively participate. When the
racial issues that do come up are dismissed out-of-hand, the sense of distance
minority students feel between themselves and the rest of the class is probably
exacerbated. Consequently, they have little if any personal connection to the
subject matter that would contribute to their understanding of the issues. Students are thus bound to master facts, values, and problems that arise out of
circumstances that are often quite unfamiliar.
Minority student alienation is in no small part attributable to a sense of
total irrelevance in the classroom. Instructors need not infer, however, that in
order to address this alienation, it is necessary to uncover the racial dimensions of every issue in every discussion. Not only would instructors feel that
they are teaching a completely different course, it would probably make minority students feel uncomfortable as well. A promising start could be made if
instructors were more conscious of the particular ways that their comments or
attitudes contribute to the alienation of minority students and if on occasion,
they included cases or discussions that might involve facts that are more familiar to minority students. This might at least neutralize the aspects of alienation that derive from feeling that the entire discussion is irrelevant to the
minority student's racial community.
THE PROBLEM OF PERSPECTIVELESSNESS IN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW

These special problems that minorities face when they confront the expectations of perspectivelessness extend beyond the classroom. Minority perspectives are devalued not simply in the discussion of doctrine, but in the
construction of doctrine as well. Attempts to bring minority perspectives to
bear in legal analysis must confront several interrelated problems. First, the
legal framework under which many cases arise often determines whose perspectives are relevant and whose are not. For a number of reasons discussed
above, minority perspectives are often excluded and dominant perspectives are
privileged in the legal inquiry. Moreover, dominant perspectives are not identified or associated with any characteristics; the perspective is nameless. Most
debilitating for minorities, however, is that while dominant perspectives are
granted the protection of apparent objectivity, minority perspectives are identified as such and viewed as subjective and biased. As a result, legal concepts,
claims, and categories that value minority perspectives are sometimes viewed
as suspect or biased.
These observations can been illustrated with a brief review of the tension
between competing frameworks for defining and remedying racial discrimination.12 Perspectives are important in determining the scope of antidiscrimination law. Yet minority perspectives are rendered irrelevant by some of the
12. See Freeman, Legitimizing RacialDiscrimination Through AntidiscriminationLaw: A Criti-

cal Review of the Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978) (characterization of the
tension within antidiscrimination law as one between a perpetrator perspective and a victim

perspective).
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United States Supreme Court's approaches in which the significance of the
victim's experience of domination is minimized by the search for an actor who
intentionally and irrationally discriminated against certain victims. The result
of this search is that protection afforded to minorities is limited.
Discriminatory intent is increasingly the sine qua non of a successful
claim. The United States Supreme Court has adopted the view that the injury
is found in the intentional deprivation of rights on the basis of race.' 3 Thus,
the inquiry focuses on the beliefs, actions, and experiences of perpetrators.
This effort to ground antidiscrimination protection in the identification of a
particular discriminating actor might appear to be rational and noncontroversial in the absence of a competing view. Yet, when we contrast this viewwhich seminar participants labeled the "discrimination approach"-with
what we called the "domination approach," another equally plausible view is
revealed. In the domination model the search for a particular perpetrator is
not as important as seeking to remedy the conditions which render the community in question subordinate to whites.'" Such an approach relies on the
reintroduction of historical details and the inclusion of the victims' personal
experiences and aspirations which initially gave rise to the case. This domination model values the perspectives of the victims and when those perspectives
are introduced, the conclusions drawn from the discrimination model make
less sense. Unlike the discrimination approach, the domination model privileges the perspective of the victim. Her views, her experiences and her condition become the focal point of the analysis. Under the domination model,
intentionality-which is the determinative factor under the discrimination
model-is but an additional insult to an already established injury.15
Thus, the doctrinal framing of an issue can determine which perspectives.
13. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (upholding a police recruitment test, despite
the test's disproportionate impact on minority applicants because there was no showing of racially
discriminatory intent); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66
(1977) (unless a party can prove "that a racially discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor
in the decision," the court will uphold the law).
14. Here I do not mean to argue that there is a causal or determinative relationship between the
adoption of the discrimination approach and the devaluing of the victim's perspective. Indeed, it is
unclear whether it is the adoption of the discrimination approach that renders irrelevant the perspective of the victim, or whether conversely, the casting of the victim's perspective as race based and
therefore biased leads to the adoption of the apparently more neutral discrimination approach. The
latter possibility is premised on beliefs in the racial neutrality of the dominant perspective and the
subsequent casting of minority perspectives as political. The popular analogue to this is the casting of
civil rights as a "special interest."
15. The difference between the way these two approaches frame the issues and thus, determine
the relevance of minority perspectives is best illustrated in the several opinions issued in City of
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). Mobile held that an at-large voting system in which no Black
had ever been elected violated neither the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, nor the 1965 Voting
Rights Act.
Justice Stewart in his plurality opinion wrote, "[The plaintiffs introduced] mechanics of the atlarge electoral system itself as proof that the votes of Negroes were being invidiously canceled out.
But those features of that electoral system,. . are far from proof that the at-large electoral scheme
represents purposeful discrimination against Negro voters." Id. at 74. Justice Marshall, in dissent,
charged, "The plurality's requirement of proof of intentional discrimination, so inappropriate in today's cases, may represent an attempt to bury the legitimate concerns of the minority beneath the soil
of a doctrine almost as impermeable as it is specious." Id. at 141 (emphasis in original).
The holding with respect to the Voting Rights Act was congressionally overruled by the 1982
amendments to the Voting Rights Act, which imposed a "totality of circumstances" test. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973(b) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1965)).
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are central and which are irrelevant in legal analysis. Moreover, the reasonableness of a particular legal framework or resolution depends, in turn, on
whether the perspective it empowers happens to be a perspective that is familiar to or shared by the analyst. When the analyst shares the perspective that is
privileged, the process seems to be reasonable, rational and objective. Because
the subjectivity of the perspective that is empowered by the doctrinal framework is rarely perceived, the results that follow from privileging that perspective are seldom regarded as being arbitrary, irrational or biased.
If it is true that the objectivity of legal analysis is grounded in the apparent perspectivelessness of the dominant discourse, then the introduction of
competing perspectives can destabilize this apparent objectivity. More importantly, creating space for competing perspectives can loosen the constraints
upon those who have been forced to adopt a perspective which is often at odds
with their reality. By contrasting alternative points of view with the dominant
perspective, the subjectivity of legal analysis is revealed.
As I have argued above, legal analysis-like other modes of analysis-is
grounded in a perspective. Since perspectives are informed in part by experiential characteristics such as race, then race often does figure into legal analysis. It is not necessary that race be explicitly referred to in order to be salient.
Formal neutrality that is often mistaken for objectivity merely masks the particular characteristics of the empowered perspective; it does not erase them.
For minorities, and particularly for minority students, the myth of perspectivelessness is often analytically and emotionally disempowering. When such
a significant part of their consciousness and life experiences is forced outside
the discourses they are left to ground their analyses on unfamiliar and alienating turf. The law school experiences of minorities parallels their experiences
before courts as often they must subordinate their interests in alleviating the
actual circumstances of racial domination to an endless search for a "smoking
rope." 16

Students as well as other minority thinkers should be encouraged to include their personal, experiential knowledge in legal analysis. The personal is
especially important in engaging in the normative debate within civil rights
law, and in the debate over the role of law in general. Consequently, as a
teacher I believe that my role is to open up possibilities for students to reconnect with their personal, experiential knowledge and to develop a critique that
reflects rather than conflicts with their experiences and characteristics.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF A CRITICAL AND COLLECTIVE PEDAGOGY

In developing this seminar, I consciously attempted to create an atmosphere in which students were not objectified, subjectified, or alienated and
where significant reserves of knowledge were not left untapped. To a certain
extent the structure of the class (small seminar), its make-up (all-minority),
and my identity (African-American female) constituted such a significant departure from the standard fare that the experience probably would have been
distinct without any conscious effort. Yet, as I have discussed above, much of
the silencing that is experienced in larger classrooms is not simply a matter of
16. UCLA Law Professor Henry W. McGee, Jr. coined this phrase, an allusion to the "smoking
gun" metaphor and the historic tyranny of "lynch law."
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the constitution of the class, but of the nature and norms of the classroom
discourse. My aim was to alter those norms, to broaden the notion of what
insight is relevant, and to empower students to feel as comfortable standing
within their own consciousness as their classmates who are unburdened with
the knowledge that theirs is not the universal view. It was important that
minority students were not the objects of an already engaged discourse, but
rather subjects in their own discourse.
Consequently, my objective was to create the conditions for students to
participate in the construction of a dialogue that was, to a certain extent,
theirs. To claim ownership of the dialogue meant that they would have to
carry responsibility for the classroom discussions; for a few, it required that
they unlearn patterns of disengagement and alienation. As the instructor, I
had to unlearn conventional ways of presenting material and conducting
classes as though the ultimate voice of authority comes from behind the podium. To accomplish these objectives I felt it necessary to embrace both critical and constructive methodologies; we would practice critical analysis and
collective production.
In order to empower students to critique the texts in their own voices, it
was important to develop a means of discussing judicial opinions in ways that
met the logic of the decisions and that were responsive to the arguments and
views expressed therein. The objective was to learn how to analyze an opinion
that carries the air of authority but which may nevertheless deny a reality that
its readers feel they know. Traditionally, too many students are rendered silent because they cannot respond, directly to the premises and rhetorical
mechanics of judicial opinions. To hone this skill, we read and criticized several texts representing views with which the majority of the students disagreed. They were asked to identify the implicit premises of the arguments
and to discuss both the descriptive and normative views that informed the
pieces. Through this process their arguments became more complex. More
importantly, the relevance of their perspective was not only affirmed, but given
a role in their descriptive or normative analyses. Thus, the simplistic phrase
"I think this is wrong," was replaced with specific arguments ranging from
empirically- or experientially-based critiques of the accuracy of the claims being made, to criticism of the normative world view implicitly or explicitly
adopted by the texts. While normative questions often drew heated and passionate discussions, I believe that all the participants left with a sense that
positions were clarified, and that alternative possibilities had been seriously
debated, rather than presumed or overlooked.
The class was organized to encourage collective production and support.17 As members of a collective, students were jointly responsible for the
success of the seminar, and would determine whether or not the time was well
spent. Students were responsible for conducting their own segment of the
17. Several students identified this concept as "Ujima," a Swahili Word adopted by Dr. Maulana
Karenga as one of the seven principles of African-American unity. Ujima represents the principal of

collective work and group responsibility. M.

KARENGA, KAWAIDA THEORY: AN INTRODUCTORY

45 (1980). Collective inquiry-has been central in the development of legal strategies to
address discrimination and segregation. For a discussion of how the team which argued the
landmark civil rights cases worked closed with faculty and students at Howard Law School see R.
OUTLINE

KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976); G. McNEIL, GROUNDWORK:
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (1983).

CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON
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seminar, which included producing the reading material and preparing an oral
presentation. Additionally, each participant gave written feed-back to each
presenter, including a critique of the presentation, the readings, and the overall project. Each student was also encouraged to consider the connections
between the presentations and her own work in order to take advantage of the
opportunity for cross-germination and mutual support.
A second objective pursued through the organization of the class was to
create an environment which was most conducive to producing publishable
work. Many students complete their formal legal education without having
produced a substantive piece of written work. Fewer still have produced publishable work. Given some of the problems identified above, I assumed that
minority students were unlikely to be inspired to engage in legal scholarship.
My approach in creating such opportunities was premised upon an assumption that students would write if they were confident and if they found a topic
and a voice with which they felt comfortable.
My effort to maximize the opportunity for the students to produce a written piece began with encouraging them to submit topic ideas by the second
class. After reviewing them I made suggestions, and asked for a revised topic
summary due two weeks later. At the fourth week, bibliographies were due,
and after the sixth week, detailed outlines were expected. After the end of six
weeks, classes were suspended for three weeks during which I met individually
with the students each week as they conducted their research and wrote first
drafts. When classes reconvened in the ninth week, the participants began
conducting the seminar and the feed-back process began. Papers were received during the fourteenth week of the semester.
The collective and critical nature of the project did not lead students to
adopt a uniform position on the political and normative issues discussed, nor
were they led to adopt a uniform analytical approach. To the contrary, as the
Comments which follow illustrate, the seminar produced a multiplicity of approaches to thinking and writing about voting rights issues within the larger
context of race, racism, and democratic domination. While some students see
value in fine-tuning dominant approaches that define and protect voting
rights, others conclude that it would be better to jettison traditional strategies
altogether and to adopt other methods to assure political participation of people of color. Moreover, while some adopt a conventional view of the standard
by which antidiscrimination opinions should be evaluated, others adopt normative positions outside conventional expectations.
The Comments that follow do not reflect an agreement on all issues relating to voting rights and to antidiscrimination law. They do, however, represent the commitment of each student to think and write about a serious
community issue, and to contribute to the production of a collective effort to
produce a timely and interesting volume of legal scholarship.. I enthusiastically applaud their efforts, and I commend the seminar participants and the
NATIONAL BLACK LAW JOURNAL for seeing the project through to
completion.

